

Philosophy of Religion  
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2.0: DE DEO:

2.1: Theologia Naturalis:

- I. Intro. Any good arguments for ex. Of God?
- II. What is a good argument?
  - A. Formally and informally valid
    1. Formally: follows logical inference forms that are correct
    2. Informally: not question begging
  - B. Consists of two, true premises
  - C. The premises are more plausible than their negations (don't have to be certain or completely plausible, but more plausible)

2.11: Cosmological Argument: Family of sufficient reason or first-cause of the existence of the cosmos: Defenders: Plato, Aristotle, Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, etc.

- A. Three types:
  1. Kalam: first-cause for the beginning
  2. Thomist: sustained ground of being for the world
  3. Leibnizian: sufficient reason for something to exist rather than nothing

See handouts:

1. Kalam: Arabic word, medieval, Islamic scholastic movement
2. Aim: The universe had a beginning in finite past, and since something can't come out of nothing, there must have been a cause
3. Demonstrate that universe began to exist against temporal infinite regress of past events shown by phil. Argument
4. Modern: looks at empirical evidence of astro-physical cosmology
5. Al-Ghazali: (See handout)

2. c. (1): If spheres have been revolving eternally, are # of rotations odd or even...but if infinite, neither...but it has to be one or the other. OR which spheres have more rotations? But if infinite, then they are all the same, but this doesn't make sense.

6. Thomist: First 3 ways:

- A. First Way: Argument from Motion (see 2<sup>nd</sup>. handout)
- 1) Not talking about a chain of causes going back into time, but a series of causes started by a first cause, without first mover, nothing else would be moving, essentially ordered simultaneous causes.
  - 2) A watch, or a train (must have an engine)
  - 3) Series: refers to spheres
  - 4) Unmoved First Mover to the outer most sphere
- B. Second Way: Efficient Causality: Not temporal series, but essentially ordered series. (see 3<sup>rd</sup>. handout)
- 1) essentially ordered series, take out first one, then you have useless intermediate causes...no motion, no effect
  - 2) not saying that if you remove the first cause, then you remove sufficient reason, BUT if you remove first cause, then there will be not causal efficacy at all.
- C. Third Way (Most Important): independent meta-physical argument (indep. Of Aristotilean Cosmology). (see 4<sup>th</sup> handout)
- 1) If only merely possible: susceptible to generation and corruption, so a merely possible being will eventually will be corrupted and there will be a time before that it was generated...can't endure forever.
  - 2) 2.b. quantifier shift? But more sympathetic view: If all things were merely possible, then nothing would exist at one time. But matter is has necessary existence for Aquinas.
  - 3) Doesn't mean logically necessary, but Aristotelian sense...angels, spheres, etc. 2.e.
  - 4) 3. distinction between essence and existence...even necessary things are contingent, essence = set of properties than define the thing \*\*\* Now if an essence is to be exemplified, there must be conjoined an act of being, a continual bestowal of being...being must be continually conjoined to the essence in order to continue to exist. If act of being removed, it is annihilated, essence has the potential to be actualized, no potential actualizes itself. There must be an external cause. Either it is composed of essence and existence OR it will be a being where there is no distinction between essence and existence.
  - 5) Didn't believe there could be intermediate causes...just inserts it for the sake of argument...only First Cause really causes, so he gets to "an absolutely necessary thing"...and

requires no sustaining cause for its existence. Can't say this being's essence includes existence (existence is not a property). Existence is an act of exemplifying an essence. This being's essence just IS existence. One sense this Being has no essence, just a pure act of being (act of being itself, ipso esse subsistenti sp? Act of being itself subsisting), so in one sense, no properties, but just IS...and Aquinas then goes to Ex. 3:15, God says, "I AM"

7. Leibniz: (5<sup>th</sup> handout): tried to develop version from contingency but without Aristotelian meta-physical underpinnings of Aquinas argument. The principles of nature and grace based on reason. First question: "Why is there something rather than nothing." Truly universal, applied to everything. Why does ANYTHING exist. Then states principle of sufficient reason: \*\*\* "No fact can be real, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise."

- A. The fact that something exists must have a reason...there must be an answer to this question.
- B. Won't do to say this is just a "brute fact," explanatory ultimate...no, must be an explanation.
- C. Can't be found in any individual thing in the universe or universe itself.
- D. See handout on "Leibniz"
- E. To say, "Something has always existed." Doesn't explain it.
- F. Therefore (step 4) there must exist outside the world and the states of the world a sufficient reason for the existence of the world.
- G. Step 5: This sufficient reason will be a metaphysically necessary being, that is, a being whose sufficient reason for existence is self-contained.

\*\*\* Evaluation:

- 1) The key issue the principle of sufficient reason...is this justified? Some theists have argued that the principle simply fails with respect to the explanatory ultimate...therefore the principle is false, can't have an explanation for everything. Swinburn uses this kind of argument and God is better explanation than physical universe. God is logically contingent.
- 2) Let's suppose principle of sufficient reason CAN apply to explanatory ultimate...can such an ultimate explain itself...see

Rowe and Rowe in Quinn (42) as well. Strong arguments against sufficient reason...if every contingent fact must have an explanation, then everything is necessary. Consider the whole body of contingent facts and make one massive contingent conjunction...what would be the explanation? Can't be contingent fact, because that fact would be outside of the conjunction and yet the conjunction includes it. You cannot have an explanation for all contingent facts...so Rowe rejects principle of sufficient reason.

- 3) Craig: Not sure if Rowe's arguments are successful. Craig thinks Rowe's arguments are questionable.
- 4) But Leibniz does not depend on sufficient reason. Stephen Davis version: Premise 1: Every existing thing has an explanation of its existence either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause (not fact or truth), just every existing THING, substance endowed with properties; Premise 2: If universe has an explanation for its existence, then that explanation is God (the contra-positive is if there is no God, then the universe exists as a brute fact...no sufficient reason for the universe). Premise 3: The universe is an existing thing (contrary to Paul Edwards and Rowe in Pojman...if you explain all the things in the universe, then the universe is not a thing...but this is WRONG...the universe IS a thing...curvature, density, pressure, age, etc....stages of the universe, etc....so Davis is right); 4. Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is GOD.
- 5) Is this a good argument: Craig: YES.
- 6) Does not presuppose a strong version of the principle of sufficient reason...shows there must be some being that exists by its own nature...this provides cause for the existence of the universe.
- 7) Atheist might have one possible retort: While the universe has an explanation to its existence, it does not lie in external ground, but in the necessity of its own nature (Premise 2 above is false)...the universe itself is the metaphysically necessary being. The suggestion of David Hume. In Natural Religion, "Why not the material universe be the necessarily existing being...?" But says Craig that this would be an extremely bold claim...we have an intuition of the universe as a contingency. A

concrete world in which no concrete objects exist is conceivable...and we usually trust our modal intuitions...if not in respect to the universe, then the atheist needs to produce a reason besides desire to avoid theism.

- 8) Still, it would be nice to have a stronger argument than just modalistic intuition.
- 9) Thomist Argument? If Aquinas is right, then universe is a contingent being...but difficulty is that it is very difficult to show that things are contingent required by this argument.
- 10) Things are naturally contingent...gravitational force, entropy, etc. But natural contingent does not suffice to establish metaphysical contingency...things composed of essence and existence...Thomist leads to an absolutely simple being, whose essence just IS existence, then deny that finite things are void of essence. "God's Essence just IS existence." But this seems unintelligible.
- 11) Craig: So Thomist argument isn't much help.

8. Kalam Cosmological Argument:

- A. Essentially property of meta-physically necessary being is that it be eternal. If universe is NOT eternal then Hume's meta-physically being of the universe won't work. But Kalam shows that universe is NOT eternal, but is contingent in its existence.
- B. Would show contingency in a very special way: Came into existence out of nothing.
- C. Atheist who answers Leibniz that universe is brute fact, then atheist is put in an awkward position to try to explain how it popped into being in the finite past. So Kalam is good supplement to Leibniz.
- D. See Handout (The Kalam Cosmological Argument)